I: Introduction
Agreement on maritime boundaries is proving to be drawn out and fractious. Of 430 potential maritime boundaries only 210 have been agreed, 49 percent of the total -a percentage that overstates progress as potential boundaries between islets in the South China Sea are not included in this figure, and disputed islands are treated as belonging to the state that currently occupies them. Moreover, boundary agreements often do not cover all jurisdictional issues -for example, fisheries management and delimitation of the continental shelf. Agreements may also not cover the full length of a potential boundary. 1 A 'state of nature' (no agreed laws) rather than a 'civil society' exists in disputed ocean space. Economic theory suggests that in the absence of property rights resources will be over-exploited and resource rents dissipated -for which in the case of fisheries there is much evidence (see Myers and Worm, 2003 , who record that industrial fishing has significantly reduced fish stocks by as much as 90 percent of their levels of 50 years earlier). Moreover, as Demsetz (1967) , Eckert (1979), and Field (1989) argue, open access regimes will be changed when the expected economic benefit of enclosing them exceeds the cost of creating and policing enclosures governed by systems of laws. Thus, with enclosure, a tract of ocean space is divided between two countries with each country gaining sovereign rights to its allocation. Both countries enjoy the full value of the resource rents available from their tracts -assuming proper economic management.
A half-way-house arrangement between not agreeing boundaries and sovereign rights behind 'lines in the sea' is that of a joint development zone (JDZ) whereby a pair of countries agree to share use of a resource -say, offshore oil, or marine fisheries. "JDZ"
here is used as a generic term covering sharing agreements described variously as "provisional agreements", "provisional measures zones", "international fisheries committees" and "reciprocal fishing access" (Xue, 2005) . Alternatively, Blake and Swarbrick (1998) also define four categories of JDZ as geological cooperation, whereby geologists determine the location of mineral deposits and national production quotas are allocated according to some boundary formula. Joint operations, whereby there is equal sharing of production regardless of which side of a theoretical boundary it occurs. For example, Germany-Netherlands share production in the Groningen gas field. United exploitation, where a single operator produces offshore oil and gas, and production is allocated according to some sharing formula; 90-10 in some oil fields in the Timor Gap for example (King 2002 By the mid-1990s only 15 offshore JDZs existed (Blake and Swarbrick, 1998 inducement to use military power in the disputed area to protect their own producers who work there, e.g. warships accompanying fishing boats (see Bateman, 1998) .
The rest of this paper continues as follows: Section II offers an economic analysis of the factors that approximately determine the choices that state level decision-makers make between moving to agreement on 'lines in the sea', agreeing to a JDZ or refusing to agree to either boundaries or to a JDZ. Woven into this analysis is empirical support for the assumptions used in the economic model. An attempt is made in Section III to explain in terms of the model the bargaining the tactics that bargainers have in fact adopted. Section IV concludes.
II: Economic Analysis
Economic theory is used to explain three observed facts: widespread lack of agreement on maritime boundaries, fewness of JDZs, and the seemingly recent trend in some regions for maritime boundaries and joint development zones to be agreed. Also assume that the ranking of resource rents available to a country are highest with an agreed boundary, lower, but positive, with a JDZ, and least, assumed equal to zero, while a dispute continues. This ranking makes sense as resource rents, in principle, could be maximized when a sovereign has full independent management rights over a tract of ocean; lower when two sovereigns have to agree and probably compromise over management rules; and lowest with open access as no sovereign is able to impose a rational system of resource management.
Assuming no boundary has yet been drawn, a country will rationally not agree to a JDZ (with its lower economic rents) if expected resource rent from gaining sovereign rights behind a boundary exceed the cost of continuing a boundary dispute.
Thus, Where E(resource rent) is the expected present value of resource rent, pr t is a decisionmaker's subjective probability of gaining sovereign rights in any given year t = 1…T, r is the decision-maker's rate of time preference, and $rent is the annual rent that would be earned if sovereign rights where won. Note that pr t may change from year to year as can the rate of time preference, r, and value of annual rent. The probability of winning sovereign rights, pr t , may change with circumstances -for example, if the other side's bargaining position is thought to have weakened pr t may increase. The rate of time preference, r, may increase if, for some reason, reaching an agreement is thought to have become more urgent. And annual resource rents may change for various reasons, for example, if newly gathered geological data indicates greater hydrocarbon deposits than previously envisaged.
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If a boundary is not agreed, the boundary dispute continues. However, there is a cost of maintaining a dispute. The expected discounted present value of dispute cost is: China came in the last decade to realize that dispute cost over maritime boundaries was simply too high.
The net advantage of continuing a boundary dispute (no boundary, no JDZ) is (3) E(net resource rent) = E(resource rent) -E(dispute cost)
Or,
(4) E(NRR) = (equation 1) -(equation 2).
The payoffs in figure 1 represent the present value of expected net resource rent, E(NRR), defined in equations (3) or (4) Note that 'resource rent' is the annual return to a country above costs of production.
'Resource rent' in this sense is different to E(NRR) as the latter includes a probability weighted component (equation (1)) as well as the expected value of future dispute costs (equation (2)).
Figure 1 is used the following way. If E(NRR) is positive for both countries each country will settle for nothing less than its preferred maritime boundary because dispute cost is low relative to the expected resource rents that may be garnered behind that particular boundary. Thus, in the northwest box the boundary dispute will continue. Now suppose that E(NRR) is positive for one side but negative for the other party. This situation favors agreement on the boundary favored by the 'positive' side. Thus, in the northeast box, E(NRR) is positive for country A, so it will continue to insist on its favored boundary, but negative for country B. In terms of our economic model, country B has no incentive to prolong the boundary dispute, and it will agree to the boundary preferred by country A. Country B thereby avoids future dispute costs but still gains some increase in resource rent, though not as much of an increase had the boundary been drawn on its terms.
If the signs of E(NRR) are reversed, negative for country A and positive for country B, we move to the southwest box in Figure 1 . In this situation the boundary favored by country B will be agreed. Country A sees both a negative return from continuing to pursue its favored boundary and some increase in its resource rents behind the boundary favored by country B.
Finally, in the southeast box E(NRR) is negative for both state parties. In this case both countries would want to abandon insistence on their particular favored maritime boundary because of the relatively high dispute costs. This situation is ripe for the compromise of a JDZ as both state parties can postpone the boundary issue while enjoying increased resource rents derived through more efficient management of the ocean tract in dispute. Another possibility is that the state parties agree on a compromise boundary, but this does lose the degree of freedom of reopening boundary negotiations within the JDZ framework. Even so, agreement on a JDZ is not necessarily straightforward because the state parties may continue to dispute over shares in resource rents.
Section III: Strategies for reaching agreement on marine boundaries
Staring from the northwest box in Figure 1 -where a dispute remains unresolved, either state party has an incentive to take actions to raise the other side's dispute costs, without at the same time raising its own. If successful, depending on which country's dispute cost increases, movement may be either to the northeast or southwest boxes where boundary agreement is on the terms of the 'positive' side country. Should both countries be successful in raising the other country's dispute costs, movement may be to the southeast box where a JDZ may be agreed.
What actions might a country take? Answers may be found by inspecting the formula for E(NRR) -equation (3).
1. "Play for time" -stonewall -making sure that the other side knows that a boundary is unlikely to be agreed for many years into the future. If successful this reduces pr t and increases T in equation (1) 
Section IV: Conclusions
This paper has offered a general economic framework in which state party bargaining strategies over agreeing lines in the ocean and related behaviors are readily understood.
The economic model takes into account both resource rents expected from a disputed tract of ocean space as well as the expected dispute costs incurred in accessing those resource rents. It is hypothesized that differences between state parties in dispute costs can significantly influence the outcome of bargaining over which lines in the ocean will be drawn if, indeed, they are drawn. When expected resource rents are high relative to dispute cost a state party will continue to insist on its preferred maritime boundary.
When this is true for both state bargainers (in a bilateral game) the prospect for agreement on a maritime boundary is dim. However, should one state party incur high dispute costs relative to expected resource rents, it is quite likely to agree on the boundary favored by the other country. Finally, when dispute costs are high for both bargainers,
each will be open to abandoning its claimed boundary and agreeing on the temporary measure of a joint development zone. A JDZ has the advantages of reducing dispute costs and increasing expected resource rents, while leaving open for future negotiation sovereign rights issues. It is also recognized that a state party not coming to a boundary agreement has incentives to take actions aimed at weakening the bargaining position of the other party. These actions are identified as specifically raising the dispute cost of the other party. Empirical evidence is brought to bear supporting the assumptions underlying the foregoing analysis. Some of this evidence relates to East Asian waters, especially to
China and the several countries in which it is in maritime boundary dispute. It is argued that China's recent willingness to create JDZ's with its neighbors is largely explained by China's perceived rise in dispute costs.
